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An Analysis of Kentucky's New
Exemption Law
By JoE LEE*
Kentucky's new exemption law,' which became effective June
16, 1966, exempts from execution one motor vehicle, without re-
gard to value. But in their zeal to assure distressed debtors ade-
quate transportation to and from their places of employment, our
legislators failed to carry forward from the old law the exemption
for such basic necessities as food and clothing.2
The purpose of this article is both to compare the new
exemption statute with the old law and to indicate whether the
new law improved the distressed debtor's legal environment. Be-
fore discussing the exemption laws in relation to the debtor's
legal environment, it seems appropriate to compare the old and
the new laws in detail as to who may claim exemptions, what
property is exempt, and how exemptions are claimed.
I. OLD AND NEw LAWS COMPARED
A. Persons Entitled to Claim Exemptions
The new law affords the same personal property and wage
exemption to a single person without dependents as to a person
with a family or the head of a household. 3 This differs from the
old law which did not allow a personal property or wage exemp-
tion for an unmarried person without dependents. 4 The new law
authorizes a personal property and wage exemption for "a person
* Referee in Bankruptcy, Eastern District of Kentucky.
1 Ky. REV. STAT. § 427.010 (1966). [Hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 Ky. Acts 1891-93, ch. 219, art. XV, § 1.
3 KRS § 427.010(1) (1966).
4 Ky. Acts 1891-93, ch. 219, art. XV, § 1; Ky. Acts 1910, ch. 120, § 1, at
341. Under the Act of 1893 wages not to exceed fifty dollars were exempt. The
Amendment of 1910 increased the exemption to sixty-seven dollars and fifty cents
and limited the wage exemption to persons with a family resident in Kentucky.
Thus single persons without dependents and nonresidents were not entitled to
either a personal property or wage exemption.
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or person with a family or head of household resident in this
state. . ."5 The old law provided such exemptions only for a
"person with a family resident in this state."0 In view of the
extension of exemptions to any "person ... resident in this state,"
the words "person with a family or head of household" may be
superfluous.
One question certain to arise is whether a nonresident employ-
ed in this state is entitled to an exemption of any portion of his
wages which are subjected to garnishment or attachment. A
nonresident may be sued in any county in which he can be served
with process.7 Ordinarily, this is the same county in which his
employer, the garnishee defendant, does business. Therefore, if
the complaint alleges nonresidency of the defendant as a bar to the
exemption, the complainant may demand remission to the court
of all the debtor's wages, subject to a determination that he is
entitled to any exemption. This practice would defeat the auto-
matic exemption provided by the new law,8 since it requires the
defendant to answer and plead residency in order to establish
his right to an exemption.
The Act of 1893 limited the personal property exemption to
a person with a family resident in the Commonwealth, but ex-
tended the wage exemption to all persons who worked for wages,
without regard to residency.9 This appears to be a more farsighted
policy than the present law. Not until 1910 was the Act amended
to limit the wage exemption to residents.' In view of the number
of nonresidents employed in the state, a return to the policy of
the earlier Act seems desirable. A nonresident should be accorded
the same wage exemption as a resident.
B. Property Exempt
1. Wearing Apparel.-The old law exempted all wearing ap-
parel, including valuable items of jewelry and mink coats, so long
as it was held for personal adornment rather than investment."
Also exempt was all the spun yarn and cloth manufactured by the
r KRS § 427.010(1) (1966).
6 Ky. Acts 1891-93, ch. 219, art. XV, § 1; Ky. Acts 1910, ch. 120, § 1 at 341.
7 KRS § 425.135 (1952).
8KRS § 425.210 (1966).
9 Ky. Acts 1891-93, ch. 219, art. XV, § 1.lo Ibid; Ky. Acts 1910, ch. 120, § 1 at 341.
1 Ky. Acts 1891-93, Id.; In re Leech, 171 Fed. 622 (6th Cir. 1909).
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family and necessary for its use.12 Further, there was no monetary
limitation on this exemption. 13 In comparison, the new law does
not provide any exemption for wearing apparel. As a result of
this apparent oversight on the part of the General Assembly, mili-
tant creditors and trustees in bankruptcy may find a new source
of recovery in jewelry, mink coats, and perhaps even in wigs,
which are now so much in vogue.
2. Foodstuff.-The old law exempted provisions, including
breadstuff and animal products, necessary to sustain the family for
one year, and provender for livestock not to exceed seventy dol-
lars in value.14 The new law does not exempt foodstuff. The fail-
ure to exempt food is not entirely frightening in this day of the
air-conditioned supermarket, since today food is usually consumed
the same week it is purchased. Nevertheless, many families have
deep freezes, well-stocked with frozen meats and dinners. It seems
anomalous that the deep freeze is exempt as a household furnish-
ing, whereas the frozen foods therein are not. Although it will not
affect everyone, the Legislature's failure to provide an exemption
for foodstuff and provender may have serious consequences for
farmers, since they often lay up stores for the family and farm
animals.
3. Farm Tools, Equipment, and Livestock.-The old law speci-
fically enumerated the exempt farm tools and equipment as two
plows and gear; one wagon, cart or dray and gear; two axes, three
hoes, one spade, one shovel, two saddles and their appurtenances,
and two bridles. 15 Further, the livestock provision specified that
two work beasts, or one work beast and one yoke of oxen, two
cows and calves, poultry on hand, not to exceed one hundred
dollars in value, and ten head of sheep, not to exceed twenty-five
dollars in value, would be exempt.16 The new law rejects this
specificity approach and exempts tools, equipment and livestock,
including poultry, of a person engaged in farming, not exceeding
fifteen hundred dollars in value.'7 It also permits the debtor to
select the items to be retained, so long as their total value does
12 Ky. Acts 1891-93, Id.
13 In re Leech, 171 Fed. 622 (6th Cir. 1909).14 Ky. Acts 1891-93, ch. 219, art. XV, § 1.
15 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
[Vol. 55,
]Kx cy's NEw EXEMPInON LAW
not exceed the allowable exemption.'8 This new blanket-exemp-
tion approach should prove less cumbersome to administer. How-
ever, the overall monetary exemption appears unrealistically low
in view of the present cost of farm machinery. For example, the
price of a tractor with necessary attachments exceeds the total
allowable exemption.' 9
4. Household Furnishings.-The old law enumerated with
specificity such exempt items of furniture as:
beds, bedding and furniture sufficient for family use; one
loom and spinning wheel and pair of cards; books not to ex-
ceed seventy-five dollars in value; six chairs, or so many as do
not exceed ten dollars in value; one cradle; washing apparatus,
not to exceed seventy-five dollars in value; one sewing ma-
chine; all family portraits and pictures; one cooking stove
and appurtenances and cooking utensils, not to exceed twenty-
five dollars in value20
The new law simply provides an exemption for "all household
furnishings," not to exceed fifteen-hundred dollars in value, and
allows the debtor to select which items of property he chooses to
retain.2'
The descriptive phraseology "household furnishings" is suf-
ficiently broad to include such modern household appliances as
air conditioners, deep freezes, stereos, and color television sets.
However, there are many items of personal property, commonly
kept in or about the home, which are not ordinarily thought of as
household furnishings. These include such familiar items as
bowling balls, golf clubs, fishing tackle, camping equipment,
power lawn mowers, ham radio equipment, and school children's
band instruments. Another issue is whether books which were
specifically exempt under the old law22 now qualify for exemption
as household furnishings. Consequently, the terminology "house-
hold furnishings" may not assure exemption of all items of
intimate personal property which the General Assembly probably
intended to include.
18KRS § 427.020 (1966).
19 The price of a medium size tractor is $3100, as quoted by local dealers.2 0 Ky. Acts 1891-93, ch. 219, art. XV, § 1.
21KRS §§ 427.010, .020 (1966).22 Ky. Acts 1891-93, ch. 219, art. XV, § 1.
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5. Motor Vehicles.-The new statute permits exemption of one
motor vehicle and its necessary accessories, including one spare
tire, owned by a person who farms or uses his car in his employ-
ment or in traveling to and from his place of employment.23 There
is no monetary limitation on the value of a vehicle which may be
claimed exempt. If a debtor owns more than one vehicle, pre-
sumably he will be entitled to select the vehicle to retain.2 4 Motor
vehicles were not exempt under the old law.25
The statute also authorizes exemption of one service vehicle of
a mechanic, electrician, plumber, or repairman.26 In addition, the
statute exempts one motor vehicle of a minister, attorney, phy-
sician, surgeon, chiropractor, veterinarian, or dentist.7 This
specific exemption of a motor vehicle for professional persons may
be redundant, since they would ordinarily be within the class
which uses a vehicle in their employment or in traveling to and
from their place of employment.2 8 The specific exemption of the
service vehicle of a mechanic or repairman an dof one motor
vehicle of a person engaged in the practice of a profession is in
lieu of the old law's exemption of one work beast.29 The motor
vehicle is the modern counterpart of the work beast.
It may be possible for two motor vehicles to be exempted. For
example, if a husband and wife each own an automobile and each
is employed so that they use the vehicles in traveling to and from
their respective places of employment, they would be entitled to
have both vehicles exempt from the claims of creditors.30 Also, a
person engaged in business as a service repairman, plumber, or the
like, might be entitled to exempt both his service vehicle and the
automobile used to commute to his business.31
One problem which frequently arises is whether a debtor is
entitled to an exemption for a mobile home or housetrailer.
Neither the old nor the new law provides for such an exemption,
although housetrailer havens are now rather commonplace. Pos-
sibly, the homestead exemption might be construed to include a
23KRS § 427.010 (1966).24 KRS § 427.020 (1966).
2 5 1n re McEuen, 19 F. Supp. 924 (W.D. Ky. 1937).2 6KRS § 427.030 (1966).27KRS § 427.040 (1966).28 KRS § 427.010(1) (1966).2 9 Ky. Acts 1891-93, ch. 219, art. XV, §§ 3, 4.
30KRS § 427.010(1) (1966.
31 KRS §§ 427.010(1), .030 (1966).
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housetrailer permanently affixed to a plot of land. However, it
seems appropriate to deal with this exemption under the subject
of motor vehicles, since our state statutes generally describe them
in terms broad enough to include housetrailers.32 Further, an
adequately drafted exemption law should make the same pro-
vision for debtors who invest in this type of "castle" as for those
who prefer the cozy subdivision home.
6. Mechanics Tools.-The new statute increases the monetary
limitation on the exemption of a mechanic's tools from one-
hundred33 to three hundred dollars.34 The new law, like the old
law, permits the debtor to select which tools to retain so long as
their value does not exceed the limitation.35
7. Professional Libraries, Instruments, and Furnishings.-The
new law retains the old law's exemption for the professional
libraries of ministers and attorneys and the instruments of phy-
sicians and surgeons.36 The monetary limitation on this exemption
has been increased from five hundred to one thousand dollars. In
addition, the description of exempt property has been broadened
to include office furnishings. Under the new law, chiropractors,
veterinarians, and dentists have been added to the list of persons
entitled to the professional exemption.31
8. Wages, Salaries, and Other Income from Labor.-The new
exemption statute liberalizes considerably the exemption of in-
come which is earned by the labor of workmen, servants, clerks,
alesmen, and all others of this class whose income is in the form
,-f wages or commissions. Under the old law, as a practical matter,
the wage exemption was limited to sixty-seven and one-half dollars
per month.38 Although the old statute exempted all but ten per
cent of salary, wages, or income earned by labor of every person
earning seventy-five dollars or less per month, this ninety per
cent exemption ceased to have any legal effect by the early 1900's
since most workmen, as a result of inflationary pressures during
32 KRS §§ 186.010(7) (a) and (b) (1962).
3 3 Ky. Acts 1891-93, ch. 219, art. XV, § 3.34 KRS § 427.030 (1966).
35KRS § 427.020 (1966); Ky. Acts 1891-93, ch. 219, art. XV, § 3.3 6 Ky. Acts 1891-93, Id. at § 4.
3 7 KRS § 427.040 (1966).38 Ky. Acts 1891-93, ch. 219, art. XV, § 1; Ky. Acts 1910, ch. 120, § 1 at 341.
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World War I, began earning more than seventy-five dollars per
month.39 Consequently, the old law's alternative exemption of
sixty-seven and one-half dollars for any person earning in excess
of seventy-five dollars per month has been the standard exemption
in Kentucky for the past fifty years.40
The new statute exempts seventy-five per cent of the net wages,
salary, commissions, or income due in any pay period of every
resident, when earned by labor.41 The exemption is limited to
fifty per cent of net earnings, when the debt to be collected was
incurred in obtaining necessities.42
Since the new wage-exemption is based on net wages and de-
termined by reference to the debtor's pay period,43 it is more gen-
erous than might first appear. When the old exemption law was
enacted, payroll deductions were uncommon for federal, state,
and local income taxes, social security, union dues, and in-
surance programs. Therefore, under the old law, gross earnings
within the thirty day period prior to service of garnishment could
be offset against the sixty-seven and one-half dollars monthly
exemption, with the result that the debtor's take home pay might
be substantially less than this amount per month. Further, if the
debtor earned and received more than this amount in gross wages
during the first week of any month, he could be denied an
exemption of any wages garnished during the remaining three
weeks.44 This hardship has been eliminated by the new law as it
gauges the exemption to the debtor's pay cycle.
Procedurally, the new wage-exemption statute is advantageous
to both debtor and employer. It is advantageous to the debtor
since the employer is authorized to pay immediately to him the
exempt portion of his wages.45 Under the old law, the employer
paid into court all accrued wages as of the date of service of
garnishment. Then, the debtor, by established practice, was re-
quired to file an answer to the complaint of the attaching creditor
39 Snyder, Garnishment in Kentucky-Some Defects, 45 Ky. L.J. 322, 329(1956-57).40Ky. Acts 1891-93, ch. 219, art. XV, § 1; Ky. Acts 1910, ch. 120, § 1 at 341.41 KRS § 427.010(2) (1966).42 Iid.
43KRS § 425.210 (1966).44 In re Willis Roscoe Sturgeon, Bankruptcy, No. 64-4004, E.D. Ky.,
March 30, 1965. Frazier v. Nashville Veterinary Hospital, 139 Tenn. 440, 201
S.W. 751 (1917).
45KRS § 425.210 (1966).
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and plead his wage exemption or forfeit it. In many instances, the
debtor's failure to file a timely answer resulted in a denial of his
exemption. In those instances where the debtor retained legal
counsel, some portion of the wages ultimately exempt were
utilized to pay the attorney's fees. The amount remaining for the
debtor and his family was paltry indeed. The new law assures the
debtor the full benefit of the wage-exemption by making it auto-
matic. He no longer has to appear in court or retain legal counsel
in order to obtain the exemption. The new law is less burden-
some from the employer's viewpoint in that he need be concerned
only with the pay period in effect at the time of garnishment.
By eliminating the multiple pay period problem, the new law
has simplified the administrative burden which wage attachments
place upon employers. Normally, most industrial employers pay
their employees the previous week's earnings not earlier than the
following Wednesday and usually a day or two later than that.
This delay in payment allows the employer time to make the
various computations and deductions required by federal and
state laws and labor-management agreements. The old practice,
which allowed sequestration of wages earned up to the day and
hour of service of an attachment, required the employer to split
a pay period and remit to the court all wages accrued as of the
date the attachment was received. The new law subjects to the
claim of a creditor who causes a garnishment or attachment to be
issued only those wages due at the end of the pay period in pro-
gress when the attachment is received. Consequently, the debtor is
entitled on payday, fee of attachment, to any wages earned during
any pay period prior to the one in which the attachment is
levied.46 In addition, at the end of a pay period in progress when
an attachment is received, the employer must also release to the
debtor the exempt portion of his wages and remit to the court
the non-exempt portion.47
Of course many questions remain to be answered. For example,
will the "first in time, first in right" rule prevail if more than one
garnishment is received in the same pay period, or must there be
a pro rata distribution of the nonexempt wages among the attach-
ing creditors? Is vacation pay, which is ordinarily accrued over
46 1964-1968 Ky. ATT'y GEN. Op. 66-522 (Aug. 18, 1966).
47 KRS § 425.210 (1966).
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many pay periods, entirely exempt from the claims of creditors?
These matters will have to be adjudicated before a final answer
can be given.
The new law prescribes that the order of attachment must in-
form the employer that only net wages are being sequestered, that
the employee is entitled to an exemption, and that the percentage
of net income to be paid the employee and the percentage to be
forwarded to the court must be specified.48 The order of attach-
ment must be served on the employer in triplicate; the employer
must deliver one copy to the employee,4 9 and he may retain a
copy for his files.50 Thus the employee will ordinarily have some
notice that a portion of his wages, due at the end of the pay period
in progress when the attachment was served, will not be available
to him. Under the old law, the debtor frequently was unaware of
attachment until he appeared to receive his pay. Moreover, he
did not receive information as to who attached his wages. The new
law requires the employer to certify on the third copy of the order
of attachment the amount of net wages due the employee at the
end of the pay period in progress at the time the order was served.
The certified copy must then be returned to the court along with
the required percentage of net wages. 51
The employee is entitled to an exemption of seventy-five per
cent of all net wages due in any pay period. However, if the debt
was incurred in obtaining necessities, only fifty per cent of net
earnings are exempt.52 Some confusion probably will occur in
the administration of the law as a result of this sliding scale wage
exemption and the ambiguous statutory language.
The new act provides that "if the judgment to be collected is
for the furnishing of necessities and the verified complaint judg-
ment and order of attachment so state then only fifty per cent of
all earnings in any pay period shall be exempt."53 Frankly, the
verified complaint judgment is nonexistent. Apparently, it was
intended that a comma should be inserted in the bill between the
words "verified complaint" and "judgment" so the statute might
properly read "verified complaint, judgment and order of attach-
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 IbId.52KRS § 427.010(2) (1966).
53 Ibid.
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ment." A better wording would be "verified complaint or judg-
ment and order of attachment."
From the statute's present wording, one might infer that there
can be no attachment before judgment. However, whether this
construction of the statute can be sustained is doubtful, since it
must be read in harmony with Kentucky Revised Statutes Section
425.185, which permits an attachment at or after the commence-
ment of an action for recovery of money or property.
The requirement that the complaint be verified when the
judgment is for the furnishing of necessities apparently conflicts
with the Rules of Civil Procedure, which abolish the practice of
verifying of complaints.54
As originally introduced in the General Assembly, the statute
defined necessities as being limited to articles of food, clothing (in-
cluding shoes), medicine, medical services, drugs, rent, and public
utilities.55 This bill was passed by the House of Representatives
by a vote of sixty-nine to eighteen on March 8, 1966,56 and re-
ceived by the Senate Rules Committee the next day.57 While in
that committee, the bill was amended by adding "furniture and
household appliances" to the classification of necessities. The
amended bill was passed by the Senate58 and the House in March,
1966, in the final days of the legislative session.59
The amendment adding "furniture and household appliances"
to the list of necessities was unfortunate. All the items or services
in this category in the original bill were consumables. Therefore,
the seller or person furnishing the services could not bring an
action for replevin. However, furniture and household appliances
are customarily sold subject to a security interest retained by the
seller. He ordinarily has a remedy by contract and at law for re-
covery of his property. Therefore, it is questionable whether he
should be permitted to attach fifty per cent of the debtor's net
wages as payments on the contract of sale. Moreover, once the
seller has reclaimed his security, it is even more doubtful that the
former exemption rate should prevail in a suit to recover any
5 4 CLAY Ky. PFACTICE 184 (1963).
55 H.B. 291, 1966 Ky. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess.56 7 LEcIs. lEc., 1966 Ky. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., No. 46 at 28 (March
19, 1966).
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
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deficiency balance under the sales contract. Another possibility is
that the fifty per cent exemption rate might be held applicable in
suits by small loan companies on notes which are secured by
security agreements covering furniture and household appliances.
These loans, which remain collectible over a fifteen year period,60
should not fall in the same classification as open-account sales of
consumable goods and services, the collection of which may be
barred by the five year statute of limitations.61
Another issue is whether the seventy-five or fifty per cent
exemption rate is applicable in a bankruptcy proceeding. In a
typical noncommercial bankruptcy proceeding instituted by an
employed wage earner, the debtor will owe approximately twenty
creditors, at least ten of which will have claims for goods and
services which are classified as necessities by the new exemption
law. It has been held that the lower exemption rate applies in a
bankruptcy proceeding when at least one of the claims on file is
based on a judgment for necessities. 62 On the authority of this
case, it appears that the lower exemption rate will ordinarily
apply in an individual bankruptcy proceeding involving an em-
ployed wage earner.
In previous Kentucky bankruptcy proceedings, wages earned
subsequent to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy did not pass
to the trustee. Under the new exemption law, it has been argued
that the cutoff date for wages passing to the trustee is not the date
the petition was filed, but the end of the pay period in effect when
the petition is filed. This is because Section 70 (c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act63 vests the trustee, as of the date of bankruptcy, with
all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor holding a lien
on property upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have
obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings, regardless of
whether such a creditor actually exists. Since under the new law
a creditor can sequester wages to the end of the pay period, may
the trustee in bankruptcy recover wages earned after bankruptcy?
For example, if a debtor, paid monthly, files a petition in bank-
ruptcy on the first day of the month, is the trustee entitled to one-
60 KRS § 413.090 (1918).
61 KRS § 413.120 (1932).62 In re French, 250 Fed. 644 (W.D. Wash. 1918).
63 Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. 110(c) (1952).
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half the wages earned in the ensuing month as assets of the estate?
These questions were answered in the negative in a recent case
which held that a trustee in bankruptcy is not entitled to any
wages earned subsequent to bankruptcy.6 4
II. THE DEBTOR'S LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
A. Waiver of Exemptions
The rule that a debtor may waive his personal property exemp-
tion in an agreement securing a loan remains unchanged.6 5 As a
practical matter, the exemption of personal property is rather
meaningless if a debtor is permitted to convey a security interest
in exempt property to secure loans made by small loan companies.
It is not at all unusual for three or more of these loan companies
to hold security agreements covering the same household goods.
The value of this security lies not in the intrinsic value of the
furniture, but in the humiliating prospect of having one's personal
belongings repossessed in front of neighbors and family. Under
Kentucky case law, the personal property exemption may not be
waived in advance,66 but this does not prohibit the contractual
waiver of exemption in specific property.6 7
The high interest rates which small loan companies are per-
mitted to charge presumably are based on the rationalization that
these companies are in the high risk, unsecured lending business.
If they are actually making secured loans, the interest rates should
be reduced accordingly. Apparently, repossessions of household
furniture are rarely affected when debtors default on loans to small
loan companies.68 According to statistics furnished the Kentucky
Department of Banking by Kentucky Finance Company, which
operated forty-eight offices in Kentucky in 1964 and forty-seven
64 In re Fisher, Bankruptcy, No. 35887, W.D. Ky., Nov. 10, 1966. Unreported
opinion by District Judge Brooks.65 Collett v. Jones & Hall, 41 Ky. Rep. 19 (1841); Harris v. Prather, 8 Ky.
Op. 799 (1876); Smith v. D. Wilson & Co., 11 Ky. Op. 946, 947 (1883);
Marguess v. Brendon, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 686 (1892).
66 Moxley v. Regan, 73 Ky. Rep. 156 (1874).67 Collett v. Jones & Hall, 41 Ky. Rep. 19 (1841), and cases cited supra
note 65.68 Based on analysis of reports of suits, possessions, and sales of chattels
filed with Comm'r of Ky. Dept. of Banking by small loan licenses pursuant to
KRS § 288.250.
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offices in 1965, this company repossessed household goods on thirty-
two accounts in 1964 and 34 accounts in 1965.69 These figures sug-
gest that small loan companies would not be seriously hampered if
their right to take mortgages on household goods was abrogated.
This would allow the debtor to receive more benefit from his
personal property exemption.
In order to assure the debtor the full benefit of the personal
property exemption, the exemption statute should be buttressed
by a companion one invalidating all mortgages, other than ven-
dors' liens, on exempt property.
B. Garnishments
A recent study in Oregon, which has the highest percentage of
bankruptcies based on population of any state, revealed that out
of 12,000 garnishments issued by the District Court of Multnomah
County, Portiand, Oregon, ninety-eight per cent were suits by
collection agencies.7 A similar study in California, which has more
bankruptcy peitions than any other state, indicated comparable
findings.71
Collection agencies derive their profit from handling the "left-
overs" of our credit economy. Generally, the usual collection
procedures are exhausted before claims are turned over to these
agencies for collection. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has rec-
ognized that collection agencies are a necessary evil.72 Often their
militant efforts in behalf of clients precipitate bankruptcy. Thus,
collection agencies sometimes operate to the detriment of other
creditors whose claims are also discharged in bankruptcy.
Actually, the threat of garnishment is the most important
cause of bankruptcy. A 1963 study of bankruptcy filings in Flint,
Michigan, revealed that only ten per cent of the individual bank-
rupts had been garnisheed within four months filing. However,
eighty per cent of the interviewed bankrupts indicated that they
had been threatened with garnishment. Seventy-five per cent in-
6 9 Analysis of reports of suits, possessions, and sales of chattels, and discussion,
supra note 68.
7o Snedecor, Why So Many Bankruptcies in Oregon? 40 REF. J. 78, 79 (1966).71 Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations,
53 CimF. L. REv. 1214, 1289 (1965).7 2 Mutual Bankers Corp. v. Covington Bros. & Co., 277 Ky. 33, 125 S.V.2d
202 (1938); see also Rohan v. Johnson, 156 N.W. 936 (N.D. 1916).
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dicated that garnishment or the threat thereof precipitated their
filing.73
The Michigan garnishment law, like Kentucky's limits at-
tachment to one pay period.74 Thus, theoretically a creditor owed
a sizeable debt must use a series of garnishments (multiple garnish-
ment) to collect. However, in Flint, Michigan, during 1963, few
debtor-bankrupts were victims of multiple garnishment. Less than
one per cent of those studied had been garnished more than once
within six months of bankruptcy. Apparently, multiple garnish-
ment was not a significant problem to the Flint bankrupts. Al-
though the threat of a second garnishment could be used as lever-
age, interviews with the bankrupts indicated that it was rarely
used.75
Opponents of Kentucky's new exemption law argued that the
high exemption rate would lead to multiple garnishments and be
more burdensome to debtors than the old law. The Michigan
experience indicates this argument may be without substance.
Contrary to proponents' hopes, the Michigan study also indi-
cates that the new exemption law will not cause a significant re-
duction in bankruptcy filings. This is because it is the threat of
garnishment rather than actual garnishment which causes the
debtor to file bankruptcy. So long as the threat exists, bankruptcy
filings are apt to remain high. Most debtors resort to bankruptcy,
not because they cannot or will not pay their debts, but merely
to avoid loss of employment, which almost inevitably results from
repeated wage attachments. Actually, bankruptcy filings in the
Eastern District of Kentucky have increased since enactment of
the new exemption law.76
C. Debt-Adjusters
The business of debt-adjusting or debt-pooling has grown con-
siderably since World War II because of the increase in consumer
7 3 Dolphin, An Analysis of Economic and Personal Factors Leading to Con-
sumer Bankruptcy at 181, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Michigan
State University Graduate School of Business Administration, Occasional Paper
No. 15 (1965).
74 23 MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27(A), at 7511.
7 5 Dolphin, An Analysis of Economic and Personal Factors Leading to Con-
sumer Bankruptcy, supra note 73, at 17.7 0 In the Eastern District of Kentucky, 843 bankruptcy cases of all types were
ified in the first six months of 1966, and 891 cases were ified in the last six
months of the year. The comparison shows an increase of 49 cases. The new
exemption statute became effective on June 16, 1966.
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credit and the need of over-burdened debtors for assistance.
Generally, the debt-adjuster contracts with the debtor to act as an
intermediary between the debtor and his creditors. The debtor
agrees to make regular payments to the debt-pooler, who in turn
promises to distribute the money on such terms as the creditors
will accept, which is not necessarily pro rata. The debt-poolers'
fees are comparatively high and, in reality, usually amount to
stacking debt on debt. One non-participating creditor can ruin the
whole arrangement by garnisheeing the debtor's wages. This
would render the debtor unable to make payments to the debt-
pooler. Once the arrangement proves unworkable, the debtor ends
up owing the debt-pooler for his services in addition to all the
original debts.
Unfortunately, there is no assurance the debt-pooler has any
more business acumen than the debtor, and in fact, many "shai-p
operators" have entered the debt-adjustment business. In 1962,
officials of two debt-pooling firms in Louisville were indicted on
thirty-six counts of embezzlement and grand larceny. They were
accused of accepting payments from debtors and appropriating the
money to their own use.7 7
At that time, a Louisville newspaper editorial pointed out that
some debt-poolers charge their victims as much as eighty per
cent, under a complicated system of hidden charges and mis-
leading terminology. Others take their percentage "off the top,"
i.e., they take their fee before applying any of the debtor's pay-
ments to his debts.78 Under this practice, creditors become restless
and garnishee the debtor's wages, causing a termination of the
plan. This occurs about the time the debt-pooler receives his fee,
thereby relieving him of any further burden of administration.
In three states, the business of debt-pooling has been out-
lawed as constituting the practice of law.79 Thirteen other states
have outlawed the activity under their police powers,80 and
7 7 The Louisville Times, Oct. 18, 1962, § 1, p. 1, col. 8; The Courier-Journal,
Oct. 18, 1962, § 2, p. 6, cal. 1; The Louisville Times, Aug. 30, 1962, § 1, p. 1,
Col. 6; The Louisville Times, Aug. 31, 1962, § 1, p. 1. cal. 1.
78The Courier-Journal, Nov. 17, 1962, § 1, p. 6, col. 1.
79 AeCommercial Debt-Poolers Engaged in the Unauthorized Practice of
Law? 18 PsalsoNLFim. L.Q. REP. 58 (1964). (Discusses an opinion by Attorney
General of Rhode Island).80 ibid.
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numerous cities have adopted ordinances on the subject.s1 The
Louisville Board of Alderman enacted a regulatory ordinance
following the debt-pooling scandal in that city. The danger of a
regulatory ordinance is that it may be misconstrued as approving
debt-pooling. Former Indiana Governor Matthew Welch recog-
nized this possibility in a message he issued in connection with his
pocket veto of an act to license and regulate debt-pooling com-
panies. He stated that there was no practical way to regulate them
and that debt-pooling plainly constituted the practice of law by
lay persons.82
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the
Kansas Prohibitory Debt-Adjustment Act, which makes it unlaw-
ful for any person other than an attorney to engage in debt-ad-
justing.83 In accord are the Supreme Courts of Massachusetts 4 and
New Jersey.85 In an opinion dated December 26, 1963, the At-
torney General of Rhode Island concluded that the state's regula-
tory debt-pooling act was unconstitutional since it authorized the
practice of law by persons, partnerships, associations, or corpora-
tions. The Attorney General stated that the Legislature could
not authorize lay persons to practice law, since the right to regulate
and control the practice of law was a perogative of the judicial
power and, under the constitution of that state, it was vested in-
herently and exclusively in the judiciary.80
Kentucky's legislators need to consider the debt-pooling facet
of the debate's legal environment. The instances in which debtors
are forced to resort to bankruptcy are increasing in this state due
to the failure of debt-pooling arrangements. These arrangements
tend to prevent the debtor from receiving adequate counseling at
an early stage of his financial difficulty, before his situation be-
comes hopeless.
81 Baltimore Adopts Ordinance to Prohibit Debt-Management Business, 18
PmsoNAL FiN. L.Q. REP. 57 (1964).82 See Veto Message, reprinted in 18 PmSONxAL FIN. L. Q. RBs'. 59 n. 1
(1964).83 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
84Home Budget Service, Inc. v. Boston Bar Assn., 335 Mass. 228, 139 N.E.
2d. 287 (1957).85 American Budget Corp. v. Furman, 175 A.2d 622 (N.J. 1961).8GAre Commercial Debt-Poolers Engaged in the Unauthorized Practice of
Law? note 79 supra.
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D. Bankruptcy
In fiscal year 1966, a record total of 192,354 bankruptcy cases
were filed in the United States. Compared to the 180,323 cases
filed during fiscal 1965, the 1966 total was an increase of 12,031
cases, or 6.7 per cent.87 This was the fourteenth consecutive year
in which the number of cases filed exceeded the total for the pre-
vious year. Actually, bankruptcies have increased every year since
1948, except for 1952, when there was less than a one per cent
decrease, attributable to the effect of the Korean war on our
economy.88 The rate of increase per year has been erratic. It has
ranged from a low of four and one-half per cent in 1956 to a high
of thirty-three and one-third per cent in 1961, with a simple
average annual increase in filing of over fourteen per cent.89 The
rate of increase in nonbusiness bankruptcies in Kentucky for the
past ten years-from 1038 cases in fiscal 1956 to 4256 cases in fiscal
1966-is typical of the national trend. 0
As one author has pointed out, the rise in bankruptcies since
1945 has been at approximately the same rate as the rise in con-
sumer credit. Figures for intermediate and short-term consumer
credit obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System reveal that consumer credit increased from $5.6
billions in 1945 to $62.3 billions in March 1963, an increase of
eleven times. Bankruptcies totaled 12,862 in 1945, contrasted with
155,493 in 1963, a twelve-fold increase. 9'
The national population figures show that bankruptcies are
rising faster than the population. The number of people in the
United States rose from 132 million in 1940 to 189 million in 1963.
This represents an increase of 43% while bankruptcies increased
197% in the same period. Looking at it another way, in 1940 one
out of every 2,500 persons filed bankruptcy in 1963 it was one
out of every 1,200 persons. 2
87 [1966] AnsmN. OFicE U.S. CTS., ANsuAL EPr. oF Dmn. at V-1.
88 [1965] ADn. OFFICE U.S. CTs., ANNUAL REP. OF Din. at V-1.
89 Ibid.; Bauner, Personal Bankruptcies Trends and Characteristics 2 (Ohio
State University College of Commerce, Division of Research, Bureau of Business
Research, Monograph No. 124, 1965).90 NAT. CONSUME FN. Ass't REsPAcH SERmc Div., REPORT ON 1966
NoNnusn.Ess BAIMUPTCIES BY STATES (Oct. 6, 1966).91 Misbach, Personal Bankruptcy in the United States and Utah at 12, May
1964 (unpublished Masters thesis at University of Utah College of Business).
92 Ibid.
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These statistics do not present the bankruptcy picture in true
focus, since filings vary considerably from state to state. For ex-
ample, six states with only 26% of the United States population
accounted for 52% of all bankruptcy petitions filed in 1966.93
These states-California, Ohio, Illinois, Alabama, Tennessee, and
Georgia-are all prosperous, industrialized states. That over one-
half the bankruptcies in fiscal 1966 were filed in these six states
suggests there is a definite relationship between bankruptcy filings
and collection procedures available to creditors.
In states which exempt all wages from garnishment or attach-
ment, there are very few individual bankruptcies. For example, in
fiscal 1966 Texas and North Carolina had only 426 and 20494 non-
business bankruptcies respectively, while Kentucky had 4,256
cases.95
III. CONCLUSION
Kentucky's new exemption law is deficient in failing to pro-
vide the exemptions for food and clothing which existed under
the old law. The personal property exemption, while generous
except with respect to farm machinery, is negated by the law
which permeits the debtor to mortgage exempt property. The new
law should prove less burdensome to employers in responding to
wage attachments. Since the wage exemption applies automatically,
the law benefits the debtor by relieving him of the duty of
setting up a formal claim. However, the law has not affected a
significant enough change in the debtor's legal environment to
stem the tide of bankruptcies. Only an exemption of all wages
from attachment can substantially reduce bankruptcies.
9 3 NAT. CONSUMER FIN. Ass'N BR.EsE-ucH Div., op. cit. supra note 90.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
